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TREATMENT OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS UNDER THE
SEC'S NET CAPITAL RULE: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
"If a loss of this magnitude had happened on my watch, I
would have slept like a baby. That is to say, I would have woken
up every two hours screaming."' So commented a derivatives2
broker and former county executive about the first reporfs of
losses from speculative trading in interest-sensitive derivatives
that eventually cost Orange County, California, in excess of two
billion dollars,3 forced the county into bankruptcy,4 and robbed
dozens of county workers of their jobs.' The ink had hardly
dried on newspaper articles regarding Orange County .when a
new story emerged about a twenty-eight-year-old trader in Sin-
gapore whose betting on derivatives tied to future fluctuations in
the Nikkei average lost $1 billion dollars and bankrupted
Barings Bank, a pillar of the British banking industry with a
history tracing back to the Louisiana Purchase.6
1. Brett D. Fromson, More Big Losses Expected from Derivatives Trading, WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 1994, at Hl, H.
2. A derivative is "[a] financial instrument that is valued according to the expect-
ed price movements of an underlying asset, which may be a commodity, a currency,
or a security. Derivatives can be used either to hedge a position or to establish a
synthetic open position." A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE 82 (Brian Butler & Alan Isaacs
eds., 1993).
3. See Jay Mathews & William L. Claiborne, Calif. County Records Huge Invest-
ment Loss, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1994, at D1; Leslie Wayne, $1.5 Billion Loss Seen
for County, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Dl.
4. See Nell Henderson & William L. Claiborne, Orange County Files for
Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at Fl; Sallie Hofmeister, Orange County,
Calif., Makes Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at Al.
5. See Nell Henderson, Orange County Auctions Securities, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,
1994, at B3; Hundreds of Jobs Likely To Go in Cuts by Bankrupt County, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at A14.
6. Fred Barbash, Huge Losses Sink Bank in London, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1995,
at Al; Richard W. Stevenson, Markets Shaken As a British Bank Takes a Big Loss,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al. Nick Leeson, the young trader at the center of
the Barings collapse, had engaged in highly leveraged gambles on the futures mar-
ket in an effort to recover from previous losses. Stevenson, supra, at D5. Although
Barings owes much of its misfortune to inadequate internal oversight, the ability of
derivatives to magnify both gains and losses also contributed to the crisis. Id.
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The Orange County and Barings debacles capped a year of
huge losses in derivatives for both municipalities and private
organizations.7 These losses have unleashed a spate of litigation
raising difficult questions about dealers' obligations to inform
sophisticated investors of risks inherent in their investments.'
They have also shaken capital markets9 and raised concerns
about the risk of a systemic collapse"° precipitated by deriva-
7. See Bankers Mistrust, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 87 (noting suits against
Bankers Trust for $11.2 million lost by Equity Group Holdings, $73 million in deriv-
atives-related losses and damages sustained by Gibson Greetings, and $130 million
and further, unspecified damages suffered by Procter & Gamble in a derivatives
deal); Martin Dickson, Atlantic Richfield Loses on Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, May 16,
1994, at 17 (noting derivatives losses of $22 million or 5.3% of the principal in one
employee investment fund); Thomas Heath, Charles County Logs $1.3 Million Invest-
ment Loss, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1994, at Bi (reporting a loss from derivatives
totaling more than $1 million); Bailey Morris, Interest Rate Swaps Not for Beginners,
INDEPENDENT, May 15, 1994, at 6 (discussing a $96.4 million loss to Air Products &
Chemicals on interest rate swaps purchased from Bankers Trust); Mutual Funds'
Derivatives Dilemma, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1994, at 69 (noting losses on account of
wagering in derivatives by mutual funds, including $268 million invested by Paine
Webber to shore up a shaky bond fund, $4 million lost by Kidder Peabody from
purchasing back questionable instruments, and $700 million lost by one Piper
Jaffray bond fund); Leslie Wayne, Local Governments Lose Millions in Complex and
Risky Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at Al (chronicling $10 million lost on
derivatives by Sandusky and Portage Counties, Ohio, $22 million in illiquid, ques-
tionable assets held by Odessa Junior College, $96 million in shaky investments
owned by City Colleges of Chicago, and a Shoshone Indian tribe's $5 million deriva-
tives loss).
8. See Orange County Inv. Pools v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re County of Or-
ange), No. SA 94-22272-JR (Bankr. C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 12, 1995); Gibson Greetings
v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 1-94-620 (S.D. Ohio filed Sept. 12, 1994); Procter & Gam-
ble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735, 1995 WL 776137 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20,
1995); Nell Henderson, Orange County Planning To Sue Three Brokerages, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9, 1994, at F2; Orange County Sues Merrill Lynch over Its Alleged Role
in Bankruptcy, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 131 (Jan. 20, 1995). The
extent of a dealer's duty to inform clients of potential risks raises challenging ques-
tions, but the issues involved are beyond the scope of this Note.
9. Barbash, supra note 6, at Al (describing a plunge in the Nikkei average of
4.59% following news of Barings' failure); Philip Coggan, Warning Against Direct
Controls on Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at 24 (recounting the theory that
reliance on derivatives may have furthered a worldwide decline in the bond markets
that accompanied a rise in U.S. interest rates); Anthony Ramirez, Derivatives Loss
Jolts Stocks; Dow Off 38.36, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at D6 (reporting that the
Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 1.03% when Orange County's loss became known).
10. "Systemic risk" refers to the threat that the default of one major derivatives
dealer will create a domino effect and cause a system-wide collapse. See Steven
Lipin & William Power, "Derivatives" Draw Warnings from Regulators, WALL ST. J.,
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tives-related losses to a major investment bank:1
The concentration of OTC [over-the-counter] derivatives ac-
tivities among a relatively few dealers could... heighten
the risk of liquidity problems in the OTC derivatives mar-
kets, which in turn could pose risks to the financial system.
Because the same relatively few major OTC derivatives
dealers now account for a large portion of trading in a num-
ber of markets, the abrupt failure or withdrawal from trad-
ing of one of these dealers could undermine stability in
several markets simultaneously, which could lead to a chain
of market withdrawals, possible firm failures, and a system-
ic crisis. 2
Derivative products create unique difficulties for federal regu-
lators seeking to protect bank customers, investors, and the
investment market from the risks posed by derivatives. The
regularity and rapidity with which investment houses develop
Mar. 25, 1992, at C1, C9.
It is the stuff of which central bankers' nightmares are made. A big
bank suddenly defaults on an interbank obligation. Other banks panic,
cutting credit lines indiscriminately. Runs develop on the defaulting bank
and on others that might be affected by its collapse. Before long, a large
portion of the world's financial system is in jeopardy. According to some
regulators and politicians, that is the sort of catastrophe now being
brought ever nearer by the fast-growing market for the financial instru-
ments-such as futures, swaps and options-known as derivatives.
The Beauty in the Beast, EcONOMIsT, May 14, 1994, at 21; see Barbash, supra note
6, at Al (quoting financial strategist Robert Sasaki's statement that "'[pleople are
even talking about the possibility that an Asian exchange could go bankrupt. . . . It
seems pretty unlikely, but the uncertainty is just feeding on itself.'") (omission in
original). See generally infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text (providing an over-
view of the operation of capital adequacy standards).
11. See Morris, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that "the proliferation of non-bank
products held by large and small individual investors . . . is raising new concern
over systemic risk"). But see Patrick Donovan, Derivatives 'Not To Blame for Crisis,'
GUARDIAN, Aug. 19, 1994, at 11 (quoting an International Securities Market Associ-
ate Report for the proposition that "[it could be argued that the biggest systemic
risk in connection with derivatives is from the irresponsible action by governments
which fail to understand the complex linkages between cash, securities lending/repo
and derivative markets").
12. Text of Executive Summary from GAO Report on Financial Derivatives, [Jan.-
June] 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 753, 757 (May 20, 1994) [hereinafter
Executive Summary].
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new derivative products severely challenge regulators. 3 Like-
wise, unpredictable fluctuations in underlying interest rates,
currencies, securities, or other investment products present
daunting problems to regulators attempting to evaluate credit
risks. 4 Even interest rate swaps, 5 among the oldest and
most-used derivatives,16 continue to present problems for feder-
al regulators trying to protect the market against risk. 7
Capital adequacy standards provide one mechanism by which
bank and securities regulators ensure that organizations main-
tain sufficient liquidity to protect customer funds and to insulate
the financial system from the possible "ripple effects" of a major
derivative dealer's default.' The Securities and Exchange
13. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
14. For example, at the end of the 1980s, some swap houses reaped the benefits
of the discovery that the "zero-coupon" valuation method for swaps provided a more
accurate picture of the future behavior of a swap than the universally used "par
yield" method. See Ronald Cooper, Swap Houses Switch to New Values, EUROMONEY,
Jan. 1987, at 32. They also found that the "zero-coupon" method provided greater
flexibility for dealing with options contained within the swaps. Id.
15. An interest rate swap is "[a] form of dealing between banks, security houses,
and companies in which borrowers exchange fixed-interest rates for floating-interest
rates, or vice versa." A DIcTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 2, at 148. Put more
simply, "'[siwaps' are bilateral executory contracts in which the parties agree to
make certain specified payments over a certain period of time." Bernard J. Karol &
Mary B. Lehman, Equity Derivatives, 27 Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. (S & P) No.
13, at 121 (July 1994).
16. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
17. See infr-a notes 145-47, 164-68 and accompanying text.
18. [Gliven the volume of interfirm dealings . .. losses may have a ripple
effect, damaging other firms and undermining public confidence in the
securities markets. The 1980 silver crisis demonstrates this point. For six
days, it appeared to government officials, Wall Street and the public at
large that a default by a single family, the Hunts, on its obligations in a
plummeting silver market might seriously disrupt the U.S. financial sys-
tem. The potential failure of even one of the various broker-dealers carry-
ing Hunt accounts threatened a financial chain reaction that would have
jeopardized commodity clearing houses and their customers, other broker-
dealers and their customers, as well as banks, public companies and
their stockbrokers. Although financial catastrophe was ultimately averted,
the silver crisis starkly revealed the fragility and interdependence of the
financial community.
Steven L. Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers' Financial Responsibility Un-
der the Uniform Net Capital Rule-A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 n.143
(1983) (quoting former SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth, The Duty To Supervise:
Self-Discipline Within the Securities Firm, Remarks to the Fifteenth Annual Rocky
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Commission's (SEC) net capital rule9 relies on risk-evaluating
formulas to determine the level of capital that derivatives deal-
ers must maintain in order to protect their swaps books.2° This
Note will address the application of the SEC's net capital rule2'
to interest rate swaps.2
This Note first will provide a primer on interest rate swaps,
including a discussion of the difficulties that swaps pose to regu-
lators trying to evaluate their credit risks. It will then discuss
the convoluted regulatory structure that permits two different
federal net capital requirements for swap dealers and allows
certain dealers to evade both. The following section will focus on
the SEC's net capital rules, provide an overview of alternatives
to the SEC's current approach, and review both the SEC's pro-
posed rules and the main alternative to the SEC's regime-the
BIS Accord's capital adequacy requirement. Finally, this Note
will criticize the proposed rules and suggest improvements in
the capital adequacy standards imposed on interest rate swaps.
It will advocate a uniform federal net capital requirement that
better reflects the risks inherent in swap mechanisms.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SWAPS
Origin of the Species
Accounts differ as to when the first swap took place. Some
trace its origin to the early 1970s, when "the over-the-counter
(OTC) markets were... blossoming with a variety of new risk-
shifting products-hybrid instruments which combined the fea-
tures of traditional debt or equity instruments with futures or
options-like components, as well as swaps and other prod-
ucts."' Still others place the first transaction later, in the late
Mountain State-Federal Provincial Cooperative Securities Conference 1 (Oct. 29,
1982).
19. Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1995).
20. See infra notes 111-41 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
SEC's net capital rule).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1995).
22. Because the term "derivatives" broadly refers to a panoply of complex instru-
ments, this Note must focus on a single class of derivative. It will concentrate on
interest rate swaps because they present relatively straightforward, yet challenging,
questions of risk assessment.
23. Sheila Bair, United States Regulation of Derivative Instruments: Reflections
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1970s or early 1980s.24 Regardless of when the first swap took
place or who should receive credit for the swap's invention, how-
ever, the number of swaps transactions has skyrocketed over the
past decade.' In 1992, outstanding interest rate and currency
swaps had reached a level approaching $3.9 trillion."
Species of Swaps
Plain Vanilla Swaps
The most basic swap, the so-called "plain vanilla" swap, in-
volves an exchange of interest rates between two parties. In a
plain vanilla swap, one party, generally called the fixed-rate
payor, agrees to make regular payments at a fixed rate to his
counterparty in exchange for regular payments by the
from a Crucial Crossroads, in DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 13, 14 (Edward J. Swan ed.,
1994).
24. See, e.g., Robert H. Litzenberger, Swaps: Plain and Fanciful, 47 J. FIN. 831,
831 (1992) (pointing to a 1981 World Bank issuance of $290 million in eurobonds
that the bank later exchanged for German and Swiss currency as the first major
swap); Sheridan Titman, Interest Rate Swaps and Corporate Financing Choices, 47 J.
FIN. 1503, 1503 (1992) (stating that the interest rate swap market "was introduced
in 1982"). A particularly entertaining story has a Citibank employee inventing the
swap in 1981 as he stood in the shower pondering a clienfs inability to access
cheap fixed-rate capital. Bruce McDougall, Derivatives De-mystifted, CANADIAN BANK-
ER, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28, 30.
25. Daniel P. Cunningham et al., An Introduction to OTC Derivatives, in SWAPS
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1994, at 121, 126-27 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-848, 1994).
26. Id. By way of illustrating the astronomical growth in derivatives, the notional
amount of swaps outstanding was a mere $3 billion dollars in 1982. Id. at 126.
27. Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 347 (1989). Because
of the large investment required of a swap participant, the parties to an interest
rate swap are usually institutions. See, e.g., id. (mentioning only companies' uses of
swaps). Nevertheless, at least in one instance, a rich individual was the end user in
a swap transaction. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(involving a surgeon with an exposure in excess of $25 million on currency futures
and options contracts), affid, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540
(1994). The explosion of derivatives and their potential for high returns has recently
made them a favorite of mutual fund managers; the introduction of derivatives into
mutual fund portfolios has thus spread the risks inherent in these instruments to
small investors. See, e.g., Mutual Funds' Derivatives Dilemma, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3,
1994, at 69 (describing multimillion dollar losses in mutual funds caused by high-
risk speculation in derivatives).
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counterparty, the so-called floating- or variable-rate payor, at a
floating rate." The floating rate usually fluctuates in accord
with the Treasury bill rate or the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR)Y This exchange of payments compares "to inter-
est payments on a... hypothetical principal amount (typically
called 'notional principal amount' or 'notional amount')," ° al-
though neither party makes any such payment of principal. 1
To illustrate a plausible swap scenario, imagine a small sav-
ings and loan (S&L) and a large international bank." The S&L
has fixed-rate assets in the way of outstanding mortgages with
an average ten-year life; it has floating-rate liabilities in the way
of demand deposits. In contrast, the large bank has LIBOR-
based assets and fixed-rate liabilities in the form of payments on
ten-year fixed-coupon Eurobonds.
Both parties seek to align their assets and liabilities. Should
interest rates skyrocket, the S&L will find itself in the unfortu-
nate position of having liabilities far in excess of its income.
Conversely, should interest rates plummet, the international
bank will face a similar dilemma. Admittedly, the S&L will
benefit if interest rates decline, and the international bank will
profit if rates rise. Nevertheless, both parties would rather
minimize their risks by harmonizing their assets and liabilities.
The S&L and bank will thus enter into a swap agreement in
which the S&L agrees to pay the bank a fixed rate several basis
points higher than the bank's payments on the Eurobond, and
the bank in return agrees to pay the S&L a rate equal to
LIBOR and several basis points above the rate that the S&L
pays depositors.'
28. Hu, supra note 27, at 347.
29. Tanya S. Arnold, How To Do Interest Rate Swaps, 62 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1984, at 96, 96. LIBOR is the rate that major banks outside of the United
States charge each other for large dollar loans. Hu, supra note 27, at 347 n.39.
30. Hu, supra note 27, at 347.
31. Id.
32. This illustration was adopted from Daniel P. Cunningham et al., Interest Rate
and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions, in SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN
1992, supra note 25, at 9, 43-47.
33. Again, this scenario presents an extremely simplified version not only of the
dynamics of a swap, but also of the organizations' motivations for entering into the
swap. In all likelihood, the large bank's superior credit rating affords it access to
1996]
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Although the plain vanilla style swap reflects the basic struc-
ture of all swap transactions, such an exchange requires two
parties with matching interest needs who seek out each other to
enter into a contract for the exchange of interest rates.' Even
if two parties with corresponding interest needs discover one an-
other, however, concerns about the credit rating of a
counterparty or nervousness about the prospect of entering into
a business relationship with an unfamiliar partner may discour-
age the parties from engaging in a swap transaction.' Further,
efforts to locate a suitably reliable counterparty with reciprocal
needs lead to increased transaction costs." These factors com-
bine to make the use of a swap dealer, whom Professor Hu has
labelled "a combination of matchmaker, guarantor and wise
man,"3 7 an attractive and necessary alternative to the plain
vanilla swap.
Intermediated Swaps
Two of the swap dealer's8 important roles are matchmaker
and guarantor.39 As matchmaker, the dealer seeks out potential
partners whose needs correspond to the needs of his client."
cheap floating-rate money, and the bank is inclined to access that money in order to
match its assets and liabilities. Barry W. Taylor, Swaps: Dealing in Interest Rates,
in SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1992, supra note 25, at 121, 124-27. Recogniz-
ing its advantage in the fixed-rate field, however, the bank opts to borrow at a fixed
rate, charge a premium, and swap with the S&L at a rate that is still lower than
any other available to the S&L. Id. In this manner, the large bank not only aligns
its assets and liabilities, but also profits from the bargain. Id.
34. See Hu, supra note 27, at 354-55.
35. John A. Lindholm, Note, Financial Innovation and Derivatives Regula-
tion-Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the Futures Trading Practices
Act of 1992, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 73, 79-80.
36. Hu, supra note 27, at 355.
37. Id.
38. The swap dealer is usually a commercial or investment bank or one of their
subsidiaries. Id. at 355. In addition, insurance companies have created affiliates in
order to enter the swaps market. See Executive Summary, supra note 12, at 757
(noting that 'the growth rate of OTC and exchange-traded derivatives from 1990
through 1992 was 100% for insurance firms").
39. See Hu, supra note 27, at 355-56; Lindholm, supra note 35, at 79-80.
40. This example again presents a simplified description of an intermediated swap.
In many cases, dealers will enter into a swap unilaterally. Hu, supra note 27, at
356. The dealer may then seek another swap partner with whom to engage in a
798
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The dealer's informational advantage and greater familiarity
with global capital markets give him an advantage in locating
suitable counterparties.4' They also permit him to exploit the
"putative arbitrage possibilities inherent in a swap."42
The swap dealer's successful location of a potential
counterparty does not, however, guarantee that the client will
agree to an exchange of cash flows with the counterparty. Suspi-
cions or ignorance about the creditworthiness of a counterparty,
as well as general concerns caused by the lack of a previous
commercial relationship, may discourage end users43 from en-
gaging in swaps." In its role as guarantor, therefore, the dealer
must act as an intermediary, "interposing itself between the two
parties in such a way that it substitutes its credit standing for
those of the parties."45
More Complex Swaps
This brief description of intermediated swaps provides a
glimpse of the equivalent of a single-cell swap; dealers regularly
create much more complex organisms. Bankers daily tailor
swaps with "caps,"' "floors," 7 and "collars"8 that better suit
mirror swap, thus allowing the dealer to create "matched books" in order to offset
its exposure. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg.
27,486, 27,487 (May 10, 1993).
41. Hu, supra note 27, at 355-56.
42. Id. at 355; see infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (describing the various
uses of interest rate swaps).
43. An end user is a "[flirmI that use[s] derivatives to manage (hedge) [its] risks
or to speculate . . . ." Executive Summary, supra note 12, at 754.
44. Hu, supra note 27, at 356.
45. Id. The dealer's matchmaking role requires that the dealer have a superior
credit rating. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg.
27,486, 27,487-88 (May 10, 1993). This necessity has driven many broker-dealers to
create subsidiaries with higher credit ratings to perform swaps. Id. at 27,488. This
phenomenon has also had the effect of insulating these affiliates from the SEC's net
capital requirements for broker-dealers. Id. Because end users place a premium on
the creditworthiness of swap dealers, however, the dealers may not willingly accept
unreasonable risk that may harm their credit ratings. See Roger D. Blanc, Policy Is-
sues Presented by Derivatives Trading, 8 Insights (P-I) No. 6, at 10 (June 1994)
('Experience points to the contrary if the alternative is a sensibly maintained system
of counterparty evaluation and monitoring . . . . Indeed, many 'unregulated' swaps
affiliates are AAA-rated and must therefore comply with stringent financial controls
imposed by the rating agencies on an ongoing basis.").
46. Caps act in the same fashion as call options and restrict the amount that
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the individualized hedging needs of their customers. In addition,
swaps increasingly contain options that permit their holders to
unravel the contracts at will or upon the occurrence of
prespecified events.49
Uses of Interest Rate Swaps
End users enter into derivative contracts for a variety of rea-
sons. Many use derivatives in order to abate possible risks
from interest rate swings; others use them for their arbitrage
potential.50
variable interest rates can rise on the notional amount. McDougall, supra note 24,
at 30.
47. Floors perform a task opposite to that of caps and limit the distance that
floating rates can fall on the notional amount. Id.
48. Collars combine a cap and a floor to set both upper and lower limits on rate
fluctuations from the notional amount. Id.
49. Telephone Interview with William C. Zachary, Vice President for Interest Rate
Derivatives, Socist6 G4n~rale (Nov. 17, 1994). Swap innovations emerge constantly.
As the SEC itself has noted:
In order to accommodate their specific needs, market participants have
developed many variations from the basic plain vanilla swap. Swap trans-
actions can be structured so that the notional principal increases
("accreting swaps") or decreases ("amortizing swaps") during the life of
the contract .... Interest rate swaps . . . can be structured so that the
cash flows are different from the normal fixed-for-float swap. For exam-
ple, the swap can be structured so that there is an exchange of a float-
ing rate for a rate that is based on an interest rate index.
Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,490
(May 10, 1993).
50. End users still value swaps primarily for their risk hedging value. Last Group
of Thirty Derivatives Study Shows Good Management, But Not by All, [Jan.-June] 26
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 553, 554 (Apr. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Last
Group] (reporting that "more than 80 percent of end users of derivatives are en-
gaged in these transactions because they are very useful for controlling risk-not for
speculative purposes"). The number of end users taking advantage of the arbitrage
value of swaps is, nevertheless, growing. Hu, supra note 27, at 363-65. This poten-
tial for arbitrage has led many unwary organizations to play the derivatives game in
search of huge profits. See Saul Hansell, A U.S. Look for Lessons in Barings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at D1, D1-D2 (quoting E. Gerald Corrigan, former president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and current chairman of Goldman, Sachs
International Advisers, who stated that "they appear to have forgotten the elementa-
ry relationship between risk and reward. If you see a 16 percent instrument in an 8
percent market, something has to tell you it's not right."). This quest precipitated
the downfall of Orange County and others like it. See supra notes 3-6 and accom-
panying text.
INTEREST RATE SWAPS
[Derivatives] can be used as a kind of financial insurance
policy, locking in currency or interest rate values for months
or years, allowing companies to plan their spending and oper-
ating budgets with some assurance. They can also be an easy
way to make an investment, with protection against losses
for the meek, or 10-to-1 leverage for the speculator.51
A lion's share of the credit for the rise in the use of interest rate
swaps belongs to companies seeking to protect themselves from
the vagaries of interest rate fluctuations.52 In such cases, a
company or bank with a fixed-rate income and floating-rate
obligations enters into a swap in order to align its capital
flows.53 In other instances, a company may desire to borrow
money at a fixed rate but may have better access to variable-
rate capital.54 By borrowing money at a variable rate and then
exchanging streams of payment with another party, the compa-
ny gains access to fixed-rate capital at a more favorable rate
than it would otherwise receive.5
Interest rate swaps also offer opportunities for arbitrage. A
swap resembles a bet in which the party seeking a fixed rate of
income bets that interest rates will fall, while the party seeking
a variable rate bets that they will rise.56 Swaps are therefore a
zero-sum game in which one party must win, and the other must
lose.5' Although engaging in the arbitrage of swaps has proved
highly profitable for many companies," it has also led to devas-
tating losses and a recent flurry of litigation.59 In light of the
51. Saul Hansell, Derivatives As the Fall Guy: Excuses, Excuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1994, §' 3, at 1.
52. See Last Group, supra note 50, at 554.
53. The S&L in the example accompanying notes 32-33, supra, entered into the
swap for this reason.
54. Hu, supra note 27, at 351.
55. Of course, this may work in reverse--the company may have better access to
fixed-rate capital but want to borrow at a floating rate.
56. Hu, supra note 27, at 348-49. Hu notes that "[t]he gambling flavor of swaps
has caused some discomfort over the possibility that swaps violate gaming laws." Id.
at 348 n.40.
57. Karol & Lehman, supra note 15, at 121.
58. See Bankers Mistrust, supra note 7, at 87 (reporting that, in 1993, one-third of
Bankers Trus's $995 million net profit came from the investment house's derivative
sales division).
59. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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inherent riskiness in the arbitrage of swaps, any changes to net
capital requirements for derivatives must reflect the different
credit risks that arbitrage swaps pose in comparison with hedg-
ing swaps.6°
REGULATORY STRUCTURE
For the moment, the SEC exercises control over interest rate
swaps not through any power to regulate the swaps themselves,
but rather through its power to regulate the broker-dealers who
traffic in swaps." This section will address the regulatory
structure that allows federal banking and securities regulators
to impose capital adequacy standards on commercial and invest-
ment banks.
CFTC Exemption
Prior to the passage of the Futures Trading Practices Act of
1992 (FTPA),6" many questioned whether derivative instru-
ments fell under the purview of the Commodities Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) or the SEC.63 In the preceding decade,
debate had raged over whether derivatives exhibited the charac-
teristics of securities, which the SEC regulates under its power
over securities products,64 or of futures and options, which the
60. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text (discussing portfolio-based risk
analysis).
61. Net Captial Rule, 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3-1 (1995). Financial industry regulators
have recently called for reconsideration of the status of derivatives products to deter-
mine whether they should label them securities, thus making the instruments sub-
ject to a more rigid regulatory regime, or to remove the current CFTC exemption.
See Jeffrey Taylor & Mark H. Anderson, CFTC To Reconsider Exemption It Gave to
Off-Exchange Derivatives Dealers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1994, at C19; Jeffrey Taylor
& Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Faces Inquiry on Derivatives Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov.
1, 1994, at C1. This represents only the latest flurry of regulatory blows in what
has been a decade-long scuffle between the SEC and the CFTC over which agency
should exercise regulatory control of derivative instruments. See Taylor & Lipin,
supra. See generally Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vimciguerra, Financial Innovation
and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1434-35 (1991) (outlining a solution to end the "turf battle" be-
tween the two agencies).
62. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
63. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 61, at 1432-35.
64. Id. Congress granted the SEC regulatory power over securities with passage of
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CFTC administers under the Commodities Exchange Act
(CEA).65
In 1987, the CFTC commissioned an Off-Exchange Task Force
with responsibility for studying derivative transactions. 6  The
Task Force submitted a report to the CFTC, which soon thereaf-
ter "began issuing no-action letters, on a case-by-case basis,
regarding specific off-exchange instruments.6 7 Broader mea-
sures followed as the CFTC first issued a statutory interpreta-
tion that excluded specific derivatives from regulation 8 and
then, in July 1989, promulgated a sweeping exemption for hy-
brid instruments,69 immediately followed by a policy statement
that created a "safe harbour' from regulation for most swaps
trading."'
In 1990, however, an unfortunate decision by a New York
federal district court7' threw a shadow of uncertainty over the
derivatives market and forced federal regulators to redouble
their efforts to find a more workable and permanent solution to
the regulatory confusion. In response to the district court's
opinion in Transnor, the CFTC asked Capitol Hill for an amend-
ment to the CEA to "clarify the legal status of swaps and other
OTC derivative instruments."' Congress responded to this de-
mand in October 1992, with the passage of the FTPA, which
"partially deregulate[d] the OTC derivatives market by granting
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994), and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1994).
65. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994). Under the Commodities Exchange Act, "futures con-
tracts may legally be traded only on a contract market designated as such under the
Commodity Exchange Act." Bair, supra note 23, at 14.
66. See Bair, supra note 23, at 15.
67. Id.
68. Statutory Interpretation and Request for Comments Concerning Certain Hybrid
Instruments, 54 Fed. Reg. 1139 (1989).
69. Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,684 (1989).
70. Bair, supra note 23, at 16 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (1989)).
71. Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). This case involved contracts for Brent blend crude oil forwards. Id.
at 1474-75. One party to the contracts convinced a federal district judge that the
agreements were off-exchange futures and thus possibly illegal under the CEA. Id.
at 1489-93. The resulting decision threw the Brent market into turmoil and ham-
pered the efforts of U.S. firms to find willing partners for 15-day Brent blend con-
tracts. Bair, supra note 23, at 16.
72. Bair, supra note 23, at 17.
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the CFTC authority to exempt classes of OTC swaps, as defined
by the Bankruptcy Code, from the exchange trading require-
ments of the CEA, or from any other CEA provision except Sec-
tion 2(a)(1)(B). . . ."" Three months later, the Commission is-
sued final rules granting a swaps exemption."
Regulation of Broker-Dealers by the SEC
Although the CFTC has exempted swaps from regulation,
other federal agencies nevertheless exercise regulatory control
over organizations that create and distribute interest rate in-
struments. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Secu-
rities Exchange Commission monitors the activities of broker-
dealers."5 Broker-dealers who participate in securities transac-
tions must register with the Commission."6 The Act requires
that an individual who registers as a broker-dealer" have
73. Lindholm, supra note 35, at 90. The Bankruptcy Code defines a swap as:
[Ain agreement . . . which is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, for-
ward rate agreement, commodity swap, interest rate option, forward
foreign exchange agreement, spot foreign exchange agreement, rate cap
agreement, rate floor agreement, rate collar agreement, currency swap
agreement, cross-currency rate swap agreement, currency option, any
other similar agreement (including any option to enter into any of the
foregoing).
11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)(A) (1994).
74. Bair, supra note 23, at 19 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 5587 (1993)).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994). The Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift
Supervision perform the equivalent function for commercial banks. The Federal Re-
serve regulates bank holding companies, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(f), 1844(b) (1994), as well
as state-chartered banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System, id. § 330. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has jurisdiction over national banks. Id.
§ 27(b). State-chartered banks that have opted for national deposit insurance fall
under the control of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See, e.g., id.
§§ 1829a, 1831a (regulating specified activities of insured state banks). Finally, the
Office of Thrift Supervision exercises regulatory control over savings and loans. Id.
§ 1463(a)(1). As with the SEC, the authority to set risk-based capital adequacy stan-
dards allows these regulators to control bank involvement with interest rate swaps.
See Stuart Somer, A Survey of Legal and Regulatory Issues Relevant to Interest Rate
Swaps, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 385, 399-401 (1992).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1994).
77. A broker is an individual "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others." Id. § 78c(a)(4). A dealer is one "in the business
of buying and selling securities for his own account." Id. § 78c(a)(5).
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membership in a qualifying self-regulatory organization,78 and
"the overwhelming bulk of broker-dealer regulation is attribut-
able to the Commission's oversight of the activities of self regu-
latory organizations... and of national securities exchanges."79
In addition, the Exchange Act bars broker-dealers from engag-
ing in fraud" or misappropriating the securities or money of
their customers8 ' and requires that broker-dealers maintain
complete records of their transactions.82 Under the Act, the
SEC can convene hearings for the purpose of investigating bro-
ker-dealers' misconduct and may punish those broker-dealers
found guilty of misconduct.'
The uniform net capital rule' may be the SEC's most impor-
tant power for policing broker-dealer actions." The net capital
rule provides the primary tool with which securities regulators
can control broker-dealer participation in swaps transactions,
and it performs an important regulatory function.8" The rule's
efficacy depends, however, on assumptions that the capital ade-
quacy equations used to set capital requirements accurately
reflect the credit risk underlying interest rate swaps and that
swaps dealers submit to the SEC's oversight by operating as
broker-dealers.
CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS
Introduction to the Operation of Capital Adequacy Standards
Although broker-dealers have had to conform to liquidity-
based capital standards since at least 1934,7 as it now stands,
78. Id. § 78o(b)(8). In addition, broker-dealers engaged in interstate business must
have membership in either a national exchange, such as the New York Stock Ex-
change, or the National Association of Securities Dealers. Id.
79. THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 380 (2d ed. 1990).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)-(2) (1994).
81. Id. § 78o(c)(3).
82. Id. § 78q(a).
83. Id. § 78o(b)(4).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1995).
85. See Blaise D'Antnoi & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir.) (call-
ing the net capital rule "one of the most important weapons in the Commission's
arsenal to protect investors"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
86. See id.
87. The Securities Exchange Act imposed capital adequacy requirements in part to
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the net capital rule owes its form mainly to the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975.88 While the Amendments garnered strong
bipartisan support, the Senate version of the legislation did not
contain a net capital provision;89 the provision was added in the
House and accepted in conference." Proponents envisaged the
rule as part of a broader regulatory mechanism to "reinforce the
traditional strength and independence of... securities markets
and the professionals who operate in them.'
Since its inception, the net capital rule has grown in impor-
tance to become "the main-stay of the financial responsibility
program of the Securities and Exchange Commission."92 Courts
have repeatedly acknowledged the SEC's broad authority to pro-
mulgate and enforce net capital rules so long as the rules are
"reasonable and not inconsistent with Congressional man-
date... ."' The requirement for retention of adequate levels of
capital is absolute, and no justification will excuse a capital deficit.'
limit brokers' ability to operate on a "shoestring." National Securities Exchang-
es-H.R. 7852: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 87 (1934) (statement of Thomas Gardiner Corcoran,
Counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77yyy to 80b-4 (1994).
89. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1975).
90. Id.
91. 121 CONG. REC. 10,464 (1975) (statement of Rep. Latta) (quoting letter from
Ray Garret, Jr., chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
92. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 18, at 1.
93. SEC v. Peerless-New York, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The
court stated:
[Tihe Commission is charged, in enforcing the legislation [enacting the
net capital rule], with making rules and regulations "necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to provide
safeguards with respect to the financial responsibility of brokers and
dealers." In carrying out this responsibility, the Commission necessarily
defined the term 'net capital" in such a manner as to render administra-
tion of the legislative command practicable. So long as such an adminis-
trative definition is reasonable and not inconsistent with Congressional
mandate, it may not be disturbed by the courts.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Don D. Anderson & Co. v. SEC, 423 F.2d 813 (10th
Cir. 1970) (finding that the net capital rule was not fatally vague and that the re-
quirement of an independent valuation of securities that lacked published market
quotations did not deny the defendants' due process rights); SEC v. C.H. Abraham &
Co., 186 F. Supp. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding that the requirement of indepen-
dent valuation under 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 was "both logical and reasonable").
94. Charters & Co., 43 S.E.C. 175, 177 (1966) (concluding that the collapse of a
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Capital adequacy standards operate in a number of ways to
ensure institutional safety.95 First, requiring financial institu-
tions to maintain sufficient capital reserves performs an impor-
tant accounting fumction. Accounting conventions require that
financial institutions first deduct any losses from their capital
reserves.97 If the broker-dealer suffers a loss, "the accounting
principle of double-entry bookkeeping means that it must...
enter a corresponding reduction on the liability side of its bal-
ance sheet."9" Adequate capital reserves thus serve to dampen
the blow of any losses, providing a "cushion [that] ... reduce[s]
the chances of balance sheet insolvency."99
Second, net capital requirements ensure that institutions'
capital levels suffice to fulfill current debt obligations.00 "The
advantage of risk based capital requirements in correcting the
disincentive to hold capital is that they force risky banks to hold
more capital without forcing safe banks to hold excessive capi-
tal."'' Greater stores of capital also allow broker-dealers to
satisfy their obligations to debtors.0 2
Third, capital rules impose discipline on capital markets,
reining in overeager broker-dealers who might otherwise put
themselves in dangerously leveraged positions.0 3 "A sudden
turn in market conditions or a loss of operational controls [can]
all too quickly erode[ away [inadequate] capital cushions and, in
situations where broker-dealers [are] highly leveraged (and thus
d[o] not have the capital to survive a reverse in conditions),
security held as capital did not "bear on th[e] issue" of consequent inadequate
capitalization).
95. See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 856
(S.D. Cal.) (remarking that the SEC's capital adequacy rules "test[] both financial
strength and liquidity"), affd in part and modified in part, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
96. Hu, supra note 27,. at 380.
97. Id.
98. RAJ BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL 27 (1989).
99. Hu, supra note 27, at 380.
100. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 18, at 18.
101. William R. Keeton, Risk Based Capital Requirements for Commercial Banks, in
1 GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS 137, 142 (Charles A. Stone & Anne
Zissu eds., 1994).
102. Hu, supra note 27, at 381.
103. Id.
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customers suffer[]. " 1°4 Because capital adequacy rules limit a
broker-dealer's ability to leverage, they also prevent broker-deal-
ers from getting into untenable positions. °5 Net capital re-
quirements thus play the dual role of limiting the chance that a
high degree of leverage will compound potential losses and cush-
ioning the blow from any such losses.
Finally, capital adequacy standards protect against systemic
risk."6 Those who worry about systemic risk fear that the fail-
ure of a major securities firm "could have deleterious effects on
markets throughout the world, causing losses to investors
around the world and impairing confidence in all of the world's
markets."' °7 Derivatives compound systemic risks because they
intertwine numerous international and capital markets.0 °
Consider the effects on the financial system of a bank offer-
ing a single derivative. In offering the derivative, the bank
needs to hedge against market risk. Instead of doing so by
simply entering into a directly offsetting derivative transac-
tion of the same type, banks will typically hedge this market
risk "synthetically," relying on mathematical strategies and
the use of a variety of instruments. For example, banks ini-
tially hedged their market risks on interest rate swaps syn-
thetically by relying on the cash market for U.S. Treasury
bonds; they later began using the futures markets, first with
Treasury-note and Treasury-bond futures and, later, with
Eurodollar and swap futures. Since hedging can involve all of
these instruments, the swaps market is now directly linked
to the Treasury bond market and many futures markets.
Thus, all manner of capital markets have been linked in
novel ways."
Requiring broker-dealers to retain certain levels of capital thus
fosters public confidence in the ability of financial intermediaries
104. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 18, at 25-26.
105. Id. at 26.
106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an
Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. S77, S85 (1992).
108. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure
and the Promise of Regulatoiy Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1502 (1993).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
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to weather rough times and prevents the runs on banks that can
topple entire segments of the financial industry."'
Overview of SECs Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1
Broker-dealers presently may choose between two methods of
calculating the amount of net capital reserves necessary to sup-
port their current indebtedness. They may elect to tie their li-
quidity levels to a percentage of their aggregate indebtedness
under the "aggregate indebtedness method,""' or they may tie
the levels to a percentage of their net debit items-the "alter-
nate net capital requirement.""'
Aggregate Indebtedness Method
The SEC's basic rule for calculating net capital reserves is the
aggregate indebtedness method, which "ties the net capital
'cushion' to a broker-dealer's liabilities."" The rule "requires a
broker to maintain a certain minimum ratio of net capital to
aggregate indebtedness so that the broker's assets will always
be sufficiently liquid to enable him to meet all of his current
obligations.""4
Under this method, broker-dealers "must have net capital
equal to at least 6 2/3 percent of aggregate indebtedness (that is,
aggregate indebtedness may not exceed 1,500 percent of net
capital).""5 The rule defines aggregate indebtedness as "the
total money liabilities of a broker or dealer arising in connection
with any transaction whatsoever... ,'," This calculation re-
quires in turn that the broker-dealer determine his net capital
reserves by subtracting liabilities from assets and making fur-
110. See generally Blanc, supra note 45 (noting that the net capital rule primarily
is intended to protect retail investors and prevent runs on banks).
111. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
113. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 18, at 16.
114. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570 n.10 (1979).
115. 7 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3137 (3d ed. 1991)
(citation omitted). More precisely, broker-dealers must retain net capital of at least 6
2/3% (100/1500).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1) (1995). The rule does, however, exempt a nunber
of liabilities from the category of aggregate indebtedness. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(i)-(xv).
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ther adjustments based on the characteristics of specific assets
and liabilities.117 In essence, the aggregate indebtedness equa-
tion "requires 'a broker or dealer to cover each dollar of its liabil-
ities with not less than one dollar and six and two-thirds cents
of liquid assets [i.e., 100 - 15].1" 118
Alternate Net Capital Requirement
Broker-dealers may elect to forego the aggregate indebtedness
method and calculate their reserve requirements under the al-
ternate net capital standard.'19 The alternate standard man-
dates that the broker-dealer retain the "greater of $250,000 or 2
percent of aggregate debit items computed in accordance with
the Formula for Determination of Reserve Requirements for
Brokers and Dealers .. . ."20 Debit items comprise all "monies
owed the broker-dealer in relation to customer transactions. '' 21
This method has become the most popular capital adequacy
equation for large broker-dealers," largely because it reduces
net capital requirements and equity charges by around fifty
percent.123
As its name indicates, the alternate net capital method is an
alternative to the default aggregate indebtedness method. A
broker-dealer opting for the alternate net capital method must
notify the appropriate examining authority of his choice. 4 The
broker-dealer must continue to operate under the alternate stan-
dard until the Commission approves any request to return to the
aggregate indebtedness method."
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(i)-(xiii) (1995).
118. 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 115, at 3148 (quoting Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
18,417, 24 SEC Dock. 594, 595 (1982)) (alterations in original).
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii) (1995).
120. Id. The formula for the determination of reserve requirements appears at 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3a ex.A (1995).
121. 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 115, at 3149-50.
122. Id. at 3152 (citing PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, RE-
PORT VI-14 (1988)).
123. Id. at 3152-53 (citing SEC, STUDY ON THE FINANCING AND REGULATION CAPI-
TAL NEEDS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY vi (1985)).




Restrictions on Withdrawal of Equity Capital
Equity capital holdings consist of the most liquid assets avail-
able to an institution and thus are the most valuable source of
liquidity if the institution needs to tap its capital reserves. 2 '
In addition to requiring net capital reserves calculated accord-
ing to either the aggregate indebtedness or alternate method,
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 also restricts the withdrawal of equity
capital from brokers' or dealers' reserves. 27 The equity capital
restrictions vary according to the capital adequacy- equation cho-
sen by the broker or dealer.' Under either method, the re-
strictions prohibit broker-dealers from withdrawing equity capi-
tal to pay partners, stockholders, sole proprietors, employees, or
affiliates. 2"
Under the basic formula, restrictions on the withdrawal of
equity capital apply when the firm's aggregate indebtedness
exceeds 1000% of its net capital.'3 ° Under the alternate ap-
proach, they come into play when net capital sinks below five
percent of total debit items.' With its emphasis on liquidity,
the equity capital requirement reinforces the underlying net
capital rule.
Current Treatment of Swaps Under 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
The SEC currently uses a bifurcated valuation process to
analyze interest rate swaps for the application of the net capital
rule. At the first stage, broker-dealers must treat the current
value of the next net interest payment due as an unsecured
receivable in the calculation of net capital.'32 As such, the swap
126. The net capital rule deems equity capital to:
include[ capital contributions by partners, par or stated value of capital
stock, paid-in capital in excess of par, retained earnings or other capital
accounts. The term equity capital does not include securities in the secu-
rities accounts of partners and balances in limited partners' capital ac-
counts in excess of their stated capital contributions.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(e)(4)(ii) (1995).
127. Id. § 240.15c3-1(eX2).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 240.15c3-1(e)(2)(v).
131. Id. § 240.15c3.-(e)(2)(vi).
132. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486,
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is treated as an "Asset[] Not Readily Convertible Into Cash,""'
and the valuator deducts its full value from the broker's net
worth.
3 4
At the second stage of the valuation process, the valuator
applies a deduction or "haircut" to the swap's notional
amount."' The haircut varies depending on the length of time
until the swap matures and whether the broker-dealer has
matched the swap."6 The haircut mechanism is part of the
SEC's strict "comprehensive" standard"1' and varies from zero
percent, for securities with less than three months until maturi-
ty," to fifteen percent, for various unhedged options. 19
The SEC's current treatment of swaps under 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 imposes onerous burdens on broker-dealers. The
Commission requires dealers to deduct the value of swap pay-
ments from net worth.40 By lumping swaps with the most
illiquid and undesirable assets, however, the SEC does not allow
dealers to count the present value of future swap payments in
the calculation of net worth.' Under the present regime,
therefore, broker-dealers who enter into offsetting swaps to
alleviate risk find themselves penalized for their prudence.
Preexisting and Proposed Net Capital Models
SEC's Proposals for Treatment of Swaps Under 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1
The SEC recently offered two proposed alternatives to the
present treatment of interest rate swaps, under the net capital
rule."' The Commission's request for comments reflected its
27,490 (May 10, 1993).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(e)(iv) (1995).
134. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(e)(iv)(E).
135. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486,
27,490 (May 10, 1993).
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(cX2)(vi) (1995).
137. Doty, supra note 107, at 885.
138. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(A)(1) (1995).
139. Id. § 240.15c3-1a.
140. See Lynn S. Hume, SEC Is Likely To Propose Capital Rules for Swaps in
Spring, Agency Official Says, BOND BUYER, Jan. 18, 1994, at 1, 27.
141. Id.
142. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486,
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concern that the restrictive regulatory regime currently in place
might drive swaps away from U.S.-registered broker-dealers."
The Commission limned three possible approaches to the
treatment of derivative products for net capital purposes. The
Commission could: (1) continue to apply the current calculus to
swaps and accept their escape from SEC regulation, (2) develop
comprehensive rules that confront the market and credit risks
that derivatives pose while permitting firms to operate their
derivatives businesses as broker-dealers, or (3) develop separate
standards for derivative product firms that operate as broker-
dealers.'44
The SEC's two proposed net capital equations for swaps repre-
sent the Commission's attempt to shape comprehensive net
capital requirements that will entice swaps dealers into becom-
ing registered broker-dealers while continuing to provide suffi-
cient capital reserves to protect against credit and market
risk.45 Although these proposals take significant steps toward
recognizing the uniqueness and volatility of interest rate swaps,
they nevertheless do not go far enough toward addressing the
panoply of swap options that dealers presently use to tailor their
products, 46 nor do they offer the flexibility necessary to re-
spond to constant innovations in the derivative industry. '
27,486 (May 10, 1993). The Commission has not yet issued final rules in response to
the requested comments. Regulatory Flexibility Agenda, Regulatory Flexibility Act
Release Nos. 33-7216, 34-36230, 35-26372, 39-2334, IC-21358, IA-1520, 60 Fed. Reg.
61,064, 61,084 (Nov. 28, 1995) (noting that "[t~he commission has proposed for com-
ment amendments to . . . the net capital rule, concerning the rule's market risk
percentage deductions for certain interest related instruments").
143. Id. at 27,488.
144. Id.
145. Credit risk stems from the chance that one party may fail to meet its contrac-
tual obligations and thus cause the other party to sustain a loss. Lynn S. Hume,
Like Other Products, Derivatives Carry a Variety of Risks; Here's Your Primer, BOND
BUYER, Oct. 6, 1993, at 6. The potential loss to the nonbreaching party generally
will not exceed the replacement cost of the contract. Id. In contrast, market risk
arises from the possibility that market swings may adversely affect the parties' de-
rivative instruments. Id.
146. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
147. See Hu, supra note 108, at 1457 (arguing that the current regulatory system
fails to address the unique attributes of derivative products and fails to respond
rapidly to financial innovation and proposing a five-point regulatory plan for policing
the derivatives industry); Hu, supra note 27, at 333 (outlining the current regulatory
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Conversion Method
The SEC's first proposal would have broker-dealers perform a
theoretical conversion of their swaps books into "a portfolio of
specified debt securities that are equivalent, in terms of interest
rate sensitivity, to the swap payment flows."148 This method
would treat swaps denominated in different currencies as if
denominated in the same currency." Broker-dealers would
then apply the net capital rule to these theoretical debt securi-
ties in the same manner as they would to zero-coupon bonds
with similar attributes and calculate the value of the converted
securities according to their bond equivalents."' Under this
system, "a swap with a notional amount of $10 million paying a
fixed rate of 6% would be treated like a long-term Treasury bond
paying 6% interest .... ,1
Notional Maturity Method
The SEC's second proposed method of valuing swaps involves
categorizing the products by the maturity of the notional
amounts. Valuators would then apply a capital charge of zero to
six percent.'52 Broker-dealers could reduce this charge by
matching their books or using other hedging techniques.'53
Like the conversion method, the notional maturity method bears
the imprint of the Commission's current regulatory philosophy
and represents yet another a twist on the "comprehensive" stan-
dards of securities haircuts based on maturity levels."
regime imposed by commercial bank regulators under the BIS Accord and suggesting
a new paradigm that would better respond to the idiosyncrasies of swaps).
148. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486,
27,492 (May 10, 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Hume, supra note 140, at 27 (citing Michael A. Macchiaroli, the associate
director for compliance and financial responsibility in the SEC's division of market
regulation).
152. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486,
27,492 (May 10, 1993).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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The BIS Accord
The treatment of swaps under the BIS Accord 55 represents
a better-conceived effort at confronting the vagaries of derivative
instruments. As with the SEC's current and proposed regula-
tions, however, the BIS Accord comes up short both in its sensi-
tivity to the unique risks posed by swaps and in its ability to
respond to evolving swap mechanisms.
Original Exposure Method
Like the SEC's net capital rules, the BIS Accord offers institu-
tions two formulas for calculating necessary levels of retained
capital. The simpler and more lenient method is the original
exposure method, which equates credit exposure with the swap's
notional amount multiplied by predetermined conversion fac-
tors.'56 The bank multiplies its credit exposure by a risk
weight that varies according to the customer's credit rating. 57
155. In 1988, the 12 member states of the Bank for International Settlements
signed the BIS Accord. Camille M. Caesar, Note, Capital-Based Regulation and U.S.
Banking Reform, 101 YALE L.J. 1525, 1536 (1992). The Accord proposed to
strengthen the commercial banking industry and to level the playing field for banks
competing in several countries. Id. at 1537. The Accord aimed specifically at increas-
ing safety by setting minimum net capital standards for internationally active com-
mercial banks. The Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency adopted the BIS Accord standards soon
after their passage. See Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 54 Fed.
Reg. 11,500 (1989) (announcing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's adoption
of the BIS standards); Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168 (1989) (an-
nouncing adoption of BIS Standards by the Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy); Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4186 (1989) (adopting the BIS Capi-
tal adequacy standards for the Federal Reserve Board).
156.
Maturity Conversion Factor
Less than one year 0.5%
One year or more but less than two years 1.0%
For each additional year 1.0%
Hu, supra. note 27, at 387. This table reflects the conversion factors for interest rate
swaps only.
157. Id. at 386. Because of lobbying by the International Swap Dealers Association
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As with the SEC's securities haircuts, these factors vary accord-
ing to the period of time before the swap matures. 5 ' This
method therefore suffers from many of the same shortfalls that
plague the SEC net capital rules.159
Current Exposure Method
The more stringent and more responsive method of valuation
follows the route taken by regulators from Britain and the Unit-
ed States. 6 ° This regime attempts to adjust for constant
swings in the value of swaps brought about by interest rate
changes. It thus has the advantage of reflecting the risk of both
current and potential exposures. 6'
Under the current exposure approach, banks calculate the
"credit equivalent amount" by adding:
(a) the total replacement cost (obtained by doing mark-to-
market valuations) of all of its contracts with positive value;
and
(b) an amount (an "add-on") for potential future credit
exposure calculated on the basis of the total notional prin-
cipal amount of its book (including contracts with positive,
zero, and negative value), split by residual maturity.. .62
and the general perception of regulators that swap customers are creditworthy, the
maximum risk weight is 50%. Id. at 386 n.154.
158. Id. at 387.
159. See supra notes 140.41 and accompanying text.
160. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (1995) (providing
the standard used by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); Capital Ade-
quacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk-Based Measure, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208,
app. A (1995) (laying out the Federal Reserve's standard for state member banks);
Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. A (1995) (setting
forth the standard used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); BANKING SU-
PERVISION DIVISION, BANK OF ENGLAND, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASLE CONVER-
GENCE AGREEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1, 10 (1988).
161. Hu, supra note 27, at 388.
162. Id. at 389. The haircuts applied to the notional amount use the following
table:
Residual Maturity Percentage Adjustment
Less than one year 0.0%
One year and over 0.5%
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As under the original exposure method, banks then apply a risk
weight to the credit equivalent amount.163 Like the original ex-
posure method, this approach represents a revamping of the
SEC's "comprehensive" standard of haircuts.
TOWARDS A MODERN TREATMENT OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS
Modification of the net capital rules poses a significant chal-
lenge for the SEC. The Commission must tread a fine line be-
tween developing meaningful capital regulations that will pro-
tect against risk and requiring painfully high levels of capital
that will drive swaps dealers overseas or into unregulated sub-
sidiaries.'64 Furthermore, the Commission must develop a set
of rules sophisticated enough to account for risks from deriva-
tives but simple enough for broker-dealers to follow.
In attempting to protect against the risk from swaps, regula-
tors revising the net capital rules need to consider four factors.
First, current formulas fail to adequately calculate the risks of
existing swaps and do not consider at all the dangers posed by
sunken options now commonplace in interest rate swaps. 165
These elements must factor into any risk-attributing equation.
Second, the current and proposed valuation methods do not fully
reflect either the risk-decreasing attributes of hedging tech-
niques or the risk-increasing attributes of arbitrage.'66 Regula-
tors must develop a system that weighs risk on more than an
instrument-by-instrument basis. Third, effective capital adequa-
cy rules must contain mark-to-market provisions requiring bro-
Id. Again, this table reflects the adjustments made for interest rate contracts only.
163. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
164. See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg.
27,486, 27,488 (May 10, 1993) (commenting on the concentration of swaps business
in the non-broker-dealer affiliates of investment banks); Executive Summary, supra
note 12, at 755 ("The issue is one of striking a proper balance between (1) allowing
the U.S. financial services industry to grow and innovate and (2) protecting the
safety and soundness of the nation's financial system."); Cunningham et al., supra
note 25, at 121, 162 (remarking that most banks do not execute swaps through
broker-dealers because of the onerous capital adequacy standards currently in place);
Doty, supra note 107, at S79 (noting that regulators must consider how the interna-
tional ramifications of their actions will affect domestic markets and investors).
165. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
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ker-dealers to reevaluate the risk on their books daily. Finally,
any new capital adequacy standards should merely represent a
next step down the road to harmonized international capital
adequacy standards. Internationalization of capital adequacy
standards will make the market more efficient by decreasing the
cost of information gathering,167 while halting any race to the
bottom among competing regulatory regimes. 68
The SEC's current proposals for revision of the net capital
rule are steps in the right direction; nevertheless, they do not
go far enough in making the changes necessary to rein in risky
derivatives activity without hobbling the broker-dealers who
engage in swaps. This section will consider the responsiveness
of the proposed regulations to the four aforementioned factors
and then propose means for fitting these factors into future
regulations.
Modification To Reflect Submerged Options
A significant inadequacy in the current and proposed capital
standards is their inability to adjust in order to reflect the sunk-
en options in swap instruments.69 Such embedded options,
however, have become increasingly important in multilateral
swap contracts.' 70 As noted previously, swaps frequently con-
167. See Steven C. Pirrong, The Economics of Risk-Based Capital Requirements, in
MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
467, 468-69 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992).
168. Blanc, supra note 45, at 14. James Doty writes that:
It]he challenge for the future will be to avoid employing lower capital
standards as a magnet to attract securities firms to a "gamblers' market"
as nations seek to maintain or enhance their exchange volume. On the
other extreme, higher capital standards may be employed as a trade
barrier to entry.
Doty, supra note 107, at 586. See generally William Gary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (advocating imposition of a
federal corporate code). But see Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of
Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985) (arguing for
sufficient variety in state corporation codes to allow firms to select compatible gover-
nance structures); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law,
8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987) (priority statistical models in rejecting arguments for
a federal corporate system).
169. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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tain cap, floor, or collar provisions, as well as other options that
permit the end user to unravel the contract should prespecified
events occur. 7 1
Despite their improvements on the current treatment of swaps
under 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1, the SEC's present capital adequa-
cy proposals and the BIS Accord nevertheless take an antiquat-
ed approach to state-of-the-art financial instruments. Although
regulators must continue to pay close attention to the shared
characteristics of broad kingdoms of financial organisms, such as
interest rate or equity instruments,"2 they must nevertheless
make greater strides towards documenting the unique behavior
of narrower phyla within these kingdoms. To do so, regulators
must develop capital adequacy formulas that incorporate "option
valuation methodology" 173 when determining risk weights for
individual swaps."4 To ensure accurate quantification of risk,
such an approach would again require dealers to share up-to-
date pricing models with regulators. Only by factoring in the
peculiar characteristics of submerged options can regulators as-
sign reasonable risk weights to individual swaps.
Portfolio-Based Risk Analysis
Swaps developed as useful mechanisms for controlling
risk;' 5 only later did they assume importance as arbitrage de-
vices. 76 Even today, end users value swaps more for use as
hedging devices than as speculative instruments.' 7 Because
swaps often exist purely to offset the risks stemming from other
instruments, regulators must consider the aggregate risk associ-
ated with a combination of instruments. Furthermore, even in
the case of swaps used for arbitrage, dealers may employ syn-
171. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
172. See Pirrong, supra note 167, at 472.
173. Id. at 473. "Option-pricing methodology" refers to the use of formulas, such as
the groundbreaking Black-Scholes model, to calculate theoretical prices for the mar-
ket value of options. See Hu, supra note 108, at 1469.
174. See Hu, supra note 108, at 1469-77; Pirrong, supra note 167, at 473.
175. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
176. See Hu, supra note 27, at 363-65.
177. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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thetic hedging techniques to limit risk. 8 Again, only an exam-
ination of the interwoven financial products provides a true view
of the potential risks.
Because swaps are frequently used to hedge against negative
interest rate swings, and because broker-dealers often employ
sophisticated techniques to control the risks posed by arbitraged
swaps, regulators cannot look only at individual derivative in-
struments when assigning risk weights. They must consider in-
stead the riskiness of entire portfolios. 79
The SEC's current and proposed net capital rules do factor
offsetting swaps into the risk equation. 8 ' Under the current
regulatory regime, the haircut applied to a swap's notional
amount changes if the swap has been matched. 8' Under one of
the two proposed capital adequacy rules, "[tihe capital charges of
long and short positions in swaps could be offset depending on
the relative maturities of the two swaps, or could be hedged
with other debt instruments."1 2
The proposed formula hints at the difficulties faced by regula-
tors trying to devise portfolio-wide capital adequacy rules. The
maturity dates of swaps within a portfolio may vary widely,
178. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
179. See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg.
27,486, 27,491 (May 10, 1993) (noting that most derivatives users would look to the
entire portfolio of "contracts and related assets and liabilities that a particular deal-
er holds" to evaluate the risk of financial loss); Executive Summary, supra note 12,
at 756 (commenting that the intertwining of derivatives with other assets and liabili-
ties means that measuring the risk of individual instruments does not adequately
calculate risk).
180. Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi), 240.15c3-la (1995); Net
Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,492 (May
10, 1993). The BIS Accord does not show the same sensitivity to the risk offsetting
abilities of swaps. Professor Bhala notes that the Basle Agreement failed to recog-
nize an important distinction between the form of a swap as a potentially risky
interest rate mechanism and a swap's substantive function as a risk-mitigating in-
strunent: "In sum, the Basle Agreement looks to whether the substantive function of
loss absorption can be performed in establishing what counts as capital. But in re-
quiring capital support for all swap transactions, the Basle Agreement does not look
to the substantive function each swap fulfills." BHALA, supra note 98, at 13 (empha-
sis in original).
181. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi), 240.15c3-la (1995).
182. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486,
27,492 (May 10, 1993).
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which means that offsetting swaps may exist in one year and
not in another. Likewise, through synthetic hedging, embedded
options, and a diversified portfolio of debt and equity holdings,
broker-dealers can offset the risks from swaps without actually
maintaining matched books. Although the proposed rule does
acknowledge the effect of diversity on risk, "the existing haircut
calculation methodology does not adequately recognize the differ-
ent risk characteristics of securities that fall within a particular
class.""
The SEC's proposed rules certainly evince an understanding
of the risk-abating effects of matched books and a diversified
portfolio. The final rules should, however, spell out more explic-
itly the process by which regulators would measure offsetting
risks. The regulations should concentrate not only on the risk
inherent in an entire portfolio; they should also recognize the
similar behavioral characteristics of certain classes of instru-
ments, such as rate swaps and mortgage-backed securities, that,
on their face, may appear dissimilar.' More importantly, the
SEC's new rules should not discourage broker-dealers from at-
tempting to control risk by requiring them to retain significant
amounts of capital for swaps held as risk-abating
instruments."5
Marking-to-Market
Under the BIS Accord's current exposure method of calculat-
ing capital requirements, U.S. and British regulators require
commercial banks to "mark-to-market" all swap contracts with
positive values.8 6 When marking-to-market, bankers must cal-
culate the cost of covering the defaulted swap with a replace-
ment contract. 7 The SEC's proposed regulations contain no
such mandate.
Because the degree of risk inherent in a swap contract fluctu-
183. Pirrong, supra note 167, at 471. In one example, Pirrong would have regula-
tors consider mortgage-backed securities in the same class as interest rate swaps
because the underlying index, i.e., interest rates, is the same. Id.
184. Id.
185. See BHALA, supra note 98, at 136-44.
186. See Hu, supra note 27, at 388-89.
187. Id. at 360.
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ates constantly with the underlying interest rate index, parties
to swaps should reevaluate their exposure from day to day."8
Although figures indicate that a substantial majority of end
users do mark-to-market their derivatives on a daily basis,"9
the SEC should nevertheless follow the lead of commercial
bank regulators and require all broker-dealers to follow this
process. 9 '
The process of marking-to-market would not only allow regu-
lators to better quantify the risk that threatens dealers, it would
also encourage the dealers themselves to take stock of their
risk. '9 Because management frequently has an incomplete un-
derstanding of the behavior and risks associated with deriva-
tives, and because regulators have an even poorer understand-
ing of novel financial instruments, mandating that dealers regu-
larly analyze their exposure would have an important preserva-
tive effect.
92
188. See Executive Summary, supra note 12, at 758.
189. Last Group, supra note 50, at 554.
190. See THE GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 7 (1994).
191. See Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Regula-
tion of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 48 (')ealers
must also have an effective system of internal controls to assess and control risks
once they are identified in the accounting and reporting systems of the firms.").
By encouraging organizational self-examination, regulators may also reduce the
"moral hazard problem." See Benjamin Weiser, Wall Street Weighs Its Own Vulnera-
bility to Rogue T 'aders, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1995, at C1, C4 (discussing the forces
that encourage traders to take risks). Individuals such as Nick Leeson, the trader at
the center of the Barings Bank failure, have little incentive not to take dangerous
risks when confronted with looming losses. If the trader wins, he will recoup his
losses and, because of his performance-based bonuses, profit handsomely. If he loses,
only the bank bears the financial risk of loss. Regardless of the unconscionable risks
taken, the trader usually stands to lose only his job. See id. (quoting Columbia Uni-
versity Law School professor John Coffee's statement that "Ie's out the door if his
losses are detected so the only rational incentive, from his perspective, is to see if
he can, by doubling his bet, turn his loss into a gain."). Because his misconduct
reached the level of criminality, however, Leeson has been sentenced to six and a
half years in prison. Jolm Gapper, Ex-Barings Chief Denies Leeson Cover-Up Attempt,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9-10, 1995, § 2, at 1.
192. See Hu, supra note 108, at 1463 ("If the puzzle is why banks know so little,
then the dilemma is how can regulators, who know even less, be effective. How can
the blind guide the nearsighted?"). Indeed, even upper-level bank managers and end
users frequently have an inadequate understanding of swaps. Id. at 1462 (noting
that some bankers admit that they do not fully appreciate the risk of derivatives
and quoting Gerald Corrigan, former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
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The high percentage of derivatives users who mark-to-market
of their own accord suggests that organizations recognize the
merit of self-evaluation. Requiring broker-dealers to regularly
recalculate the cost of replacing their outstanding swaps would
thus not only allow regulators to assess risk, it would also en-
courage organizational introspection and push broker-dealers to
consider the level of exposure that would make them attractive
counterparties to swap transactions.
193
Harmonization of Net Capital Standards
For the SEC truly to ensure that its capital adequacy require-
ments function to protect all derivatives users from the risk of
undercapitalized counterparties, the Commission must follow
the lead of commercial bank regulators and establish uniform
international capital standards.'94 The need for a unified net
capital system becomes more pressing in the face of the ever in-
creasing globalization of the securities industry generally and of
derivatives in particular.'
York, as stating that derivatives "must be understood by top management, as well
as by traders and rocket scientists"); see also Derivatives Survey Measures Lack of
Understanding at Top, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Apr. 4, 1994, at 4 (noting that
many "directors of derivatives dealer firms do not fully understand the uses and
risks of derivatives").
193. See generally Blanc, supra note 45, at 10 (advocating imposition of tighter
internal controls by market participants). Because many swaps dealers operate as
affiliates to registered broker-dealers in order to raise their credit rating, see Net
Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-32256, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,487-88
(May 10, 1993), they would likely take steps to reduce their economic exposure and
thus make themselves more attractive to potential counterparties. A requirement of
regularly marking-to-market might, therefore, spur the development of systems of
"private ordering" and "internal evaluative regimes" that would help to limit
counterparty credit risk. See Blanc, supra note 45, at 13.
194. See Executive Summay, supra note 12, at 759 (calling on federal regulators to
harmonize disclosure, capital, examination, and accounting standards for derivatives).
See generally supra note 155 (providing Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulations adopting the
BIS Accord).
195. See f-u, supra note 108, at 1502; Executive Summary, supra note 12, at 758
(stating that the intertwining of global markets caused by the rise of derivatives
"increase[s] the likelihood that a crisis involving derivatives will be global"); Alex
Brummer, For the City Gravy Train, Change at Whitehall, GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 1994,
at 17 (citing regulator Andrew Large's warning of 'increasing global systemic risk in
the financial markets"); Coggan, supra note 9, at 24 (noting theory that derivatives
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The imposition of reasonable, harmonized net capital require-
ments furthers the interests of the financial industry, for such
standards would simplify the task of "measuring and monitoring
counterparty risk."'96  Harmonization would also put an end
to any "regulatory 'arbitrage' between and among the major
regulatory systems."'97 Under the "race to the bottom" theory
of regulation,"' countries will compete in an effort to entice
swaps dealers to do business within their boundaries. Only by
standardizing the international regulation of derivatives will
regulators prevent regulatory comparison shopping by deriva-
tives brokers. The SEC should, therefore, regard any new capital
adequacy standards as laying the groundwork for a future, uni-
fied net capital system.'99
CONCLUSION
Derivatives hold at least partial responsibility for the giant
losses suffered by entities such as Barings Bank and Orange
County and for the significant swings in stock and bond
indexes that accompanied those losses. Although no segment
of the financial industry has buckled under these forceful
blows, the sensitivity of financial markets to derivatives loss-
es suggests that a system-wide meltdown fueled by deriva-
tives is not inconceivable.
The SEC's net capital rule plays an important role in mitigat-
ing systemic risk. In order to ensure that the rule continues to
abate risks, however, the Commission must redesign it to pro-
tect against the dangers of derivatives. However, the require-
may have contributed to the decline in world bond markets that accompanied a rise
in U.S. interest rates in early 1994).
196. Blanc, supra note 45, at 12 (commenting, however, that "it is unlikely that
there will be true uniformity internationally in the near term").
197. Id. at 14.
198. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
199. Even a step-by-step process of harmonization would contribute greatly to risk
reduction in the derivatives industry. Many of the suggestions in this Note, such as
scrutinizing portfolio-wide risk and marking-to-the-market, are sound business prac-
tices that help promote a "systemG of private ordering." Blanc, supra note 45, at 15;
see Executive Summary, supra note 12, at 755-56. The International Securities Deal-
ers Association has already standardized its agreement forms and other documenta-
tion, thus facilitating private ordering. Blanc, supra note 45, at 12.
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ments should not become so restrictive as to force swaps dealers
into jurisdictions imposing laxer regulatory regimes.
To this end, regulators must consider four factors as they
revise the net capital rule's treatment of interest rate deriva-
tives. First, they must design rules that adequately reflect the
risks posed by swaps, taking into account the idiosyncratic be-
havior of submerged options. Second, any revised regime must
differentiate between swaps held for hedging purposes and those
held for arbitrage purposes and must, therefore, calculate risk
on a portfolio-wide basis. Third, regulators must encourage insti-
tutional introspection by requiring that broker-dealers mark-to-
market their swaps on a frequent and regular basis. Finally,
new capital adequacy standards must represent a first step
down the road to international harmonization of net capital
requirements. Only then can the SEC be certain that all swaps
dealers will fall under an enlightened regulatory regime that
protects the market against the dangers of speculation while
encouraging broker-dealers to take the measured, well-consid-
ered risks that fuel economic progress.
Matthew Calhoun Frost
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